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1. Introduction
Innovation has become the quintessential feature of commer-
cial, political, economic, and business development. Thus, public
innovation policy has crossed over from being one aspect of indus-
trial policy in the mid-20th Century – through patent rights,
government procurement and research and development [R&D]
support (Scherer, 1970, pp. 122–125); to a top national priority in
the early 21st Century – requiring holistic systems reviewof a coun-
try’s innovation policy and performance (OECD, 2005). Apart from
a systematic reviewof allmemberOECD countries’ innovation poli-
cies, there have been a plethora of government initiatives—national
independent reviews (e.g. Cutler Innovation Review in Australia),
“green” policy discussion papers (e.g.Growth and Innovation Frame-
work in New Zealand), and “white” paper policy documents (e.g.
Science Budget and Innovation Letter in The Netherlands). Given this
recent strong political focus on public innovation policy as an eco-
nomic strategy, there needs to be framework to conduct empirical
research and also to design appropriate innovation policies. A polit-
ical economy framework for innovation does not exist, and this
article develops one by applying some fundamental contributions
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fromapioneer inpolitical economy,MichałKalecki (Harcourt, 2006,
pp. 160–164).
As a starting point, still the best deﬁnition of innovation comes
from Joseph Schumpeter, who began the modern-day research into
innovation. Schumpeter deﬁned innovation in ﬁve forms: (i) new
products unfamiliar to consumers, (ii) new methods of production
or new ways of handling commodities (processes), (iii) opening up
newmarkets not entered into previously, (iv) new sources of supply
of raw materials or half-manufactured goods, and (v) new organ-
isation of the competitive structure of an industry (Schumpeter,
1938, pp. 63–66).1 All ﬁve forms are transformational as they
lead to what Schumpeter called, “creative destruction”—destroying
the old forms of accumulation and replacing it with new forms.
These transformations work through innovation processes which
are bounded by the speciﬁc institutions and political frameworks
(or political economy) that inﬂuence the development of any par-
ticular innovation.2
1 The economics literature generally supports this view of innovation. In the con-
text of the discussion that follows, it is interesting to note that Kalecki (1954, p. 158)
identiﬁes innovation with a very similar list of phenomena to that of the ﬁve forms
by Schumpeter.
2 For example, the innovationpath ofmilitary technology is heavily circumscribed
by the particular needs of warfare, from Spartan hoplite to USA stealth bombers.
Jones (1987) explains these processes.
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How is innovation to thrive? O’Hara (2007, p. 15) recog-
nises in the context of political economy that there is the
innovation–competition dialectic that provides the dynamic force
for innovation. The competitive search for proﬁts brings forth
innovation (or creative destruction) within the environment of
instability and uncertainty inherent in all market systems. If inno-
vation is not strong enough, accumulation (or physical investment)
will falter due to declining monopoly rents from the innovation.
If competition is too strong, the monopoly proﬁts become quickly
dissipated so that adequate rates of return are not realised. This also
threatens accumulation. The task of political economy is to under-
standhowcapitalismstayswithin thesenarrowboundaries inorder
to operate and then develop innovation policies that encourage
and support accumulation for all the ﬁve Schumpeterian forms of
transformational innovation.
Public and private institutions (conventions, rules, routines)
exist to allow the system to continue to replicate itself. There are
speciﬁc interventions into the innovation-competitive dialectic to
ensure the narrow boundaries are maintained for the continuation
of innovation. Such intervention can be either commercial (e.g. Bill
Gates monopolising information technology) or political (e.g. war-
fare needs for military technology). A political economy framework
for innovation needs to critique the current situation in innovation
performance and then to devise policy-induced interventions that
serve the best interests of the broader community and not purely
the narrow interests of some powerful commercial organisations
and their political supporters. This will help to sustain the sys-
tem within a certain politically acceptable range of inequality and
instability.
Innovation performance is not easy to measure. For the OECD to
measure innovation in their reviews of member countries, Aubert
(2006) developed a list of 17 indicators for the effectiveness of
a nation’s innovation system. This long list has input indicators
like business expenditure on R&D per capita and government
effectiveness, to output indicators like patent applications and
productivity growth. A “scorecard wheel” is then drawn to make
comparisons between countries. Fromapolitical economyperspec-
tive, the OECD identiﬁes such innovation performance as being
inﬂuenced by four major criteria of the national innovation sys-
tem: (i) framework conditions for innovation arising out of the
nation’s regulations, customs and rules; (ii) governance of the inno-
vation system through public planning, funding and cooperative
linkages; (iii) competitive university-based research funding and
training, and (iv) promotion of innovation within ﬁrms and across
the business sector through supply-based competence measures
and demand-based procurement measures (OECD, 2006, pp. 7–8).
This OECD innovation review agenda provides the background to
the critical framework developed below.
Section 2 outlines the role of innovation based on Schumpeter’s
long-run perspective, and then incorporates the cycle and trend
perspective of Michał Kalecki. This allows the introduction of the
role of government in Section 3 via an approach to political econ-
omy devised by Kalecki for employment policy. Section 4 adopts
this approach to develop a framework for critiquing the strategy of
public innovation policy in general. Political economy implications
for innovation policy are then derived in Section 5, followed by a
short conclusion.
2. Cycle and trend: role of innovation in Schumpeter and
Kalecki
Schumpeter is recognised as the economist who put innovation
into thecentreof theeconomicprocessand inspired the recent large
impressive research agenda of neo-Schumpeterian evolutionary
economics (see Malerbo and Orsenigo, 1997). Schumpeter (1939)
is a massive two-volume thesis on the processes of innovation
and their absorption into the capitalist business cycle mecha-
nism. For Schumpeter, this mechanism is a complex interaction
between three classes of cycles. Major innovations initiate long
wave (Kondratieff) cycles in which the boom develops from thor-
ough far-reaching changes of the “technology system” (Freeman
andPerez, 1988,p. 46). The roughly10-year Juglar investment cycles
provide the accumulation of capital stock to impel technology sys-
tems forward. Schumpeter saw the trendof Juglars forming the long
waves, with a strong accumulation process carrying the technology
system on the upswing of the long wave. The roughly 40-month
inventory (Kitchin) cycles reﬂect demand for the end products and
whose trend forms the Juglars. Coincident trough in all three cycles
results in deep recessions. In essence, Schumpeter argues that there
would be no business cycles with deep recessions if not for the
clustering of innovations around technology systems that leads to
bunching of investment in order to implement (or commercialise)
these innovations.
Rothbarth (1942), in his review of Schumpeter (1939), rejects
the strict procedural linkage between innovation and investment,
but appreciates that uncertainty created by the innovation process
leads to strong dependence of physical investment (whether by
equity funds or by leverage with debt funds) on current proﬁts. To
Rothbarth, it is this argument which connects Schumpeter to the
work of Kalecki. Synthesis between Schumpeter and Kalecki, iden-
tiﬁed by Rothbarth, provides the starting point for examining the
role of innovation in Kalecki. Rothbarth (1942, p. 227) argues that
the proﬁt link to investment, so crucial in all of Kalecki’swork, is the
“adaptation mechanism” that enables the bunching of investment
(in Juglars) behind some long-run innovation “impulse”. This turns
Schumpeter’s long-run supply-side process into one that is cen-
tred on effective demand. Thus, the inﬂuence of effective demand is
based on the speed and strength of diffusion of innovation as deter-
mined by the ability of ﬁrms to invest in innovation out of proﬁts.
Time lags in investment are crucial in the innovation process, as
Kalecki emphasises but Schumpeter rejects.
Rothbarth’s assessment of Kalecki’s work was based on the
complete re-investment of proﬁts in Version I of Kalecki’s busi-
ness cycle model from the 1930s. This was only the beginning of
a major lifelong investigation into cycles and growth. In this ver-
sion, a dampenedcycle resultswithgrowth coming fromexogenous
shocks. Cycle Version II in the 1940s introduced semi-autonomous
development factors, notably innovation, to “. . .engender a long-
run upward trend” (Kalecki, 1954, p. 151). Finally (2 years before his
death) in Kalecki (1968), cycle Version III makes innovation specif-
ically endogenous to the investment process, thus integrating the
cyclical short-term with the long-run growth trend. Thus, the trend
and cycle should not be considered separately. For this ﬁnal version,
inventions that are commercialised through investment “. . .add to
proﬁt expectations over and above those generated by the move-
ment of demand in the course of the cycle” (White, 1999, p. 347),
leading to a cumulative process of cyclical growth.3 White (1999)
identiﬁes two reasons in Kalecki (1968) to account for this. One is
increased productivity in the form of process innovation that incor-
porates technical progress in new capital equipment, making the
3 Goodwin (1967) independentlydevelopeda similarmodel of cyclical growthand
developed this further alongKaleckian lines inGoodwin (1990, p. 99)with the search
for ever-renewed proﬁt through technical change as the innovation impetus at the
investment cycle trough. Goodwin (1987, p. 106) explains that “growth generates
cycles and. . .cycles interrupt growth. Such was the view of Marx, a view that was
absorbedandelaboratedbySchumpeter, buthas remainedperipheral tomainstream
economics”. The innovation-instigated cyclical growth process is based on Marx’s
law of capitalist accumulation (Marx, 1954, p. 574), which “provided inspiration to
contemporary writers, in particular Kalecki and Goodwin” (Medio, 1987, p. 667).
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previous capital stock technologically obsolete.4 The other is prod-
uct innovationcoming fromthe stimulus to investmentarising from
entrepreneurs wanting to be the “. . .ﬁrst to avail themselves of the
technicalnovelties” and thusaddinganewlevelofdemand(Kalecki,
1968, p. 269).5
At this point of the analysis when effective demand has been
clearly established in the innovation process, Kalecki’s approach
can be linked back to Schumpeter. White (1999, p. 350) recognises
“. . .the stream of inventions underlying the process of innovation
could be sufﬁciently erratic to provide the irregularity in economic
behaviour necessary to produce deviations in demand and output
from those anticipated by producers.” With the diffusion of suc-
cessful innovations, Courvisanos (1996, pp. 114–139) shows that
these deviations can be seen as triggers for cyclical investment
turnarounds in periods when commitment of orders to investment
is highly susceptible, either as toohigh (over commitment at expan-
sion peak) or too low (under commitment at contraction trough).
There can be reinforcement of this process by the inventorymecha-
nism, in that any small upswing of an inventory cycle at the trough
of a business (or Juglar) cycle provides a favourable climate for the
spread of investment embodying innovation. This is particularly
helpful for explaining the most difﬁcult aspect of any cycle, the rise
out of a contraction. In this respect bunching of investment occurs
as per Kalecki, with the stimulus from clusters of ‘basic’ innovations
as per Schumpeter.6
From the effective demand perspective, it is the accumulation
process which forms a chain of short period situations that deter-
mines the long-run economic growth path (Kalecki, 1971, p. 165).
In support of this perspective, Lowe (1976, p. 10) explains that
the long-run “secular process is, in fact, an abstraction derived
from a sequence of short-term movements, the latter being the
only ‘real’ processes”. Courvisanos (1996, pp. 156–159) speciﬁes
how the accumulation process, stimulated by innovation, unfurls
a long wave trend line out of the short-term investment cycle
whilst impacting on proﬁt returns at the margin. The suscep-
tibility concept of tension felt by entrepreneurs in relation to
their fragile conﬁdence is the mechanism that drives accumula-
tion in innovation and provides the link from short-term business
cycles to long waves. A “constellation” of successful incremen-
tal and radical innovations that cluster together, applying new
basic scientiﬁc principles (Freeman and Perez, 1988, pp. 4607),
ameliorates the susceptibility of entrepreneur-owners to accu-
mulation, providing strong investment expansions and pushing
up the long-run trend of economic activity.7 On the other hand,
monopoly control of technology systems by relatively conservative
entrepreneur-managers intensiﬁes susceptibility to provide less
4 Salter (1966) developed this aspect of process innovation that has been the basis
of much research work in the area of obsolescence (see Bloch et al., 2007).
5 White (1999, p. 350) identiﬁes a third reason from a Srafﬁan perspective. This is
the stimulus to investment “arising from changes in relative proﬁt rates as a result
of changes in technology.”
6 Empirical work by Courvisanos and Verspagen (2002) using long run patent
data supports bunching effect of investment (á la Kalecki) while identifying the
clustering of innovation (á la Schumpeter). This is in contradistinction to Silverberg
and Verspagen (2003) who ﬁnd no clustering of basic innovations. This implies that
one basic innovation leads to a cluster of incremental innovations in support of
the one basic technology system (Perez, 2002, p. 27). All this cluster cycle research
is distinctly different from the neoclassical real business cycle research agenda in
which clusters occur only due to expectational errors as deviations from the natural
(equilibrium) rate, and which Zarnowitz (1985) surveyed as empirically inadequate
in explaining business cycles.
7 As Courvisanos (1996, p. 109) elaborates: “. . .strong growth in aggregate invest-
ment due to new technology, if diffused quickly into a particular industry, would
produce large amplitudes in ﬁrm investment expansions and small amplitudes in
ﬁrm investment contractions. This then produces an upward investment growth
trend quicker and stronger than in industrieswhere adaptation to the newparadigm
is slower.”
potent expansions and possibly even reducing the long-run path
of economic activity.
Effective demand also has important consequences in terms
of the innovative potential of an economy. Demand-pull innova-
tion theorists, led by Kaldor (1966) at the macroeconomic level
and Schmookler (1966) at the microeconomic level, have produced
a plethora of studies identifying the causal sequence from scale
economies achieved through expanded demand that increase the
rate of investment and thus determine the rate of innovation.8
Fontana and Guerzoni (2008) distinguish between the Schmook-
ler market size demand-pull hypothesis that induces primarily
process innovation and the Myers and Marquis (1969) user-led
demand-pull hypothesis popularised by von Hippel (2005) which
induces chieﬂy product innovation. Kalecki clearly recognises this
sequence, despite having identiﬁed the innovation-driven process.
Kalecki places demand-pull innovation into an appropriate effec-
tive demand context by viewing both hypotheses as “part and
parcel of ‘ordinary’ investment” demand (Kalecki, 1954, p. 158).
This occurs, for example, when there is R&D investment by large
ﬁrms stimulated by strong sales or investment in the user industry,
both demand-inducing innovations evidenced through intellectual
property rights. Courvisanos (1996, p. 42) calls this “endogenous”
innovation.
Within this innovation-investment Kaleckian process is the
basic model for cycles and trend of a capitalist economy with
no state apparatus. Governments, by becoming heavily involved
in innovation and investment policies add a political economy
element to this cycle and trend which Kalecki did not explicitly
develop. However, there is a political economy model that Kalecki
developed in relation to employment policy and its impact on cycle
and trend. The next section outlines this model.
3. Kalecki’s political aspects of full employment
What does “political aspects” mean in terms of economics? Let
us ﬁrst examine it from the perspective that Kalecki wrote about it
in 1943 in the context of the Great Depression experienced through
the 1930s. In his extensively quoted article, Political Aspects of Full
Employment [PAFE] (1943), Kalecki developed a Marxian class anal-
ysiswhere the capitalist class prevails over the political institutions
of society.
Kalecki identiﬁed various political ‘stop-go’ actions operating
over theperiodof abusiness cycle. That iswhy this analysishasbeen
dubbed “political business cycles”. Proﬁts begin to be squeezed
at the top of the boom as consumption spending slows down.
Capitalist entrepreneurs have the exclusive control of accumula-
tion, and under these proﬁt squeeze conditions they make the
decision to reduce their investment spending, which turns the
pure capitalist business cycle into a contraction phase. Keynesian
macroeconomic policies provide the method by which this con-
traction can be prevented and full employment maintained. This
is through stimulation of effective demand via raising govern-
ment spending, reducing taxes and lowering interest rates (with
increased money supply). These three policy instruments can be
employed to affect an expansionary impact on the economy. This
policy troika again has been implemented in the aftermath of the
2008 Global Financial Crisis [GFC].
Keynes (1936) expressed faith that the power of his effective
demand idea will be used to stabilise the business cycle at full
8 Kleinknecht and Verspagen (1990) use Schmookler’s cross-sectional dataset to
support the hypothesis that market size inﬂuences innovative activity, but also raise
empirical issues of mutual dependence of demand and innovation. To counter these
problems, Pavi and Vivarelli (2007) use time series data to empirically show that
demand-pull is important at macroeconomic, sectoral and ﬁrm levels.
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employment. Osiatyn´ski (1990); Kalecki (1943) also recognised the
powerful tool of effective demand management by government
(since he developed this same analysis in 1933), but he also
recognised the stronger power of business interests to prevent this
from occurring. Kalecki speciﬁed three fears that capitalists have
with Keynesian full employment: (i) Loss of economic control when
demand management policies aim for stability, thus effectively
depriving capitalists of both their power to inﬂuence economic
conditions though their investment decisions and also their power
to inﬂuence governments themselves. (ii) Loss of policy control as
governments extend their impact through their own investment
spending into areas regarded as business’s legitimate sphere of
inﬂuence (e.g. transport, public utilities). (iii) Loss of industrial
control of the workforce if governments are able to maintain full
employment over the long-run, so that ‘the sack’ ceases to play its
disciplinary role for businesses.
Applying these three fears, a political business cycle [PBC]
emerges. Towards the top of the expansion phase of the cycle, the
combination of proﬁt squeeze and inﬂationary pressures manifests
itself in a signiﬁcant negative shift in the state of business conﬁ-
dence. This is reﬂected in proﬁt rates falling, ﬁnancial gearing rising
and capacity utilisation falling as large capital investment projects
come on stream at the time when consumption rates are slowing
down (Courvisanos, 1996). Business interests enlist rentier inter-
ests to support them in having mainstream economists identify the
economy as “unsound” (Kalecki, 1971, p. 144). Pressure is placed
on governments to renege on full employment commitments and
introduce the ‘stop’ elements of ﬁne-tuning by using policy instru-
ments to dampen effective demand. This ensures the demise of
old capital stock and the reduction in real wages, essential in the
renewal of capitalism.
The ‘go’ policy elements of government stimulation in effective
demand are then used when business interests enlist workers to
support them in having mainstream economists declare a slump
as detrimental to the economy. There would, however, be strong
debate between all these supporters of stimulation as to the pre-
cise instruments and extent of their use. A stimulation package
allows the cycle to move into a new expansionary phase, with
new capital stock coming forward on the basis of innovation in
newer technological developments. Old capital stock can then be
decommissioned so that utilisation rates are manageable in rela-
tion to new investment spending (Galbraith and Darity, 1994,
pp. 459–468). Kennedy (1973) provides empirical support in the
U.K. (1953–1971) for a “predominantly” planned ‘stop-go’ policy
approach,with technical errors due to poor forecasting playing only
a relatively minor role.
Bhaduri and Steindl (1983), Catley and McFarlane (1981) and
Steindl (1979) use PAFE to explain the long-run implications of the
PBC in terms of a ‘political trend’. These studies draw on the histori-
cal developments in advancedcapitalist economies to showthat the
shift in economic policies in the early 1970s from Keynesian ‘stop-
go’ policies to Friedman’s monetarism and neoliberalism is due to
the same three fearsKalecki identiﬁed inPAFE. Thedifference is that
in this version of the class-based PBC a longer timeframe allows
what Mair and Laramie (2002) refer to as “. . .feedbacks between
capitalists and workers over the political and social tensions of full
employment to work themselves through.” These feedback effects
generate rent-seeking behaviour by powerful monopoly control
interests who form ‘distributional coalitions’ to shift proﬁt shares
upwards by establishing obstacles in the road to full employment.
These coalitions reduce efﬁciency and depress the adoption of new
technologies in an effort to skew the income shares. Mair and
Laramie (2002) provides empirical evidence to reveal the end of the
post-war ‘full employment’ stop-go strategy in the early 1970s coin-
cided with the only signiﬁcant period of income share turbulence.
Aschauer (2000) sets out empirical evidence for the USA that sup-
ports this contractionary political trend with the decline of public
investment since the early 1970s. Catley and McFarlane (1981) and
Otto and Voss (1994) are two studies that provide similar historical
evidence for Australia.
The contractionary political trend enabled the capitalist class to
assert its economic and social dominanceover labour and to cleanse
capital of inefﬁcient and oversupplied old stock. This process varies
in timeoverdifferent economies,with theUSA leading thewayafter
the 1990–1992 recession into a new age of active innovation, stim-
ulating large private investment spending and generating a new
expansionary political trend. This expansionary trend consists of
a new dynamic in public policy governance that has a PBC per-
spective as governments support rearmament (and war), tax cuts
for the rich, innovation-supported subsidies and allowances, and
‘cheap money’ in a fragile ﬁnancial system. Kalecki (1945) identi-
ﬁed these stimulatory policies which have been reactivated by the
USA at the start of the 21st Century.
PAFE raises in policy terms what Harcourt (2006, p.147) calls
the “Kaleckian dilemma”. As economists, Keynes and Kalecki both
provided the policy tools and techniques that have the potential
to ensure full employment, even with rising inﬂation concerns as
the economy reaches towards full capacity. Both recognised this
inﬂation threat and developed approaches to manage it. Yet, from a
political economy perspective, Kalecki recognised that full employ-
ment isunattainable.HavingaMarxist perspective, heaccepted this
dilemma as inevitable since it exists because of the contradictions
of capitalism itself.
4. Political aspects of innovation
In this section, the PAFE approach is appropriated to critique
the process of public innovation policy-making. Whereas above
in the PBC story innovation played only a minor role, in this
section innovation is the central character around which policy
revolves. Immediately after World War II [WWII] all the developed
economies pledged allegiance to attainment and maintenance of
full employment as the panacea for the inherent crises of capital-
ism. This approach was rejected in the 1970s, with emergence of
the contractionary political trend as described in the previous sec-
tion. This, however, raised a signiﬁcant concern as there was no full
employment public policy geared toproviding the stimulus of inno-
vation out of troughs in the business cycle. The policy framework
thus became one that was more closely related to Kalecki (1945),
withgovernmentpolicy aiming to stimulateprivate investment and
innovation that is supported by new capital equipment.
Innovation is incorporated into investment theory as innovation
alters the incentive to invest by changing the cost of production or
altering product demand to raise proﬁtability. Osiatyn´ski (1991);
Kalecki (1968) and Laramie and Mair (2007) both imply technical
progress in their investment function speciﬁcations but only indi-
rectly, the former by theory and the latter by empirical estimation.
Salter (1966) links the inducement to invest to new technology by
utilising a vintage capitalmodel inwhich innovation is embodied in
capital equipment. Thus, governments have developed innovation
policies aimed at stimulating investment with innovation, which
Porter (1990) has seen as crucial in building a nation’s compet-
itive advantage. Such policies work through various approaches
like rearmament, R&D subsidies, technology park infrastructure
like incubators, tax credits, and supportive income tax cuts for the
higher income groups. This shift from direct employment policies
to stimulating investment policies is exempliﬁed by the reduc-
tion in emphasis on tariff protection policies aimed at supporting
employment in protected industries. Tariffs have been replaced by
innovation policies which aim to guide and support transformation
of the economy into a new technological age, while employment is
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seen in the role of a useful spillover (or externality) to the techno-
logical imperative.
The ‘political aspects of innovation’ [PAI] can be identiﬁed in
all periods of capitalism, but it took on a much more signiﬁcant
role with the shift from protection to innovation. Conforming to
PAFE, the PAI approach identiﬁes three fears that capitalists have
with robust innovation: (i) Loss of economic control with respect
to their individual market power as innovation encourages new
entrants that have the potential to reduce the incumbents’ market
share and ability to control the market. Along with this comes the
fear of the lack of adequate ﬁnancial capital to support incumbents’
innovations. Governments have various innovation policies to sup-
port the incumbents; notably, R&D subsidies and tax concessions
for incremental innovations, patent protection and other intellec-
tual property rights [IPR].9 (ii) Loss of policy control as innovation
becomes distributed across society through the public institutions
and public infrastructure that create the national innovation sys-
tem. Governments have developed various strategies that support
incumbents to regain some policy control, notably deregulation,
privatisation, public–private infrastructure programs and public
contracting.10 (iii) Loss of industrial control of the workforce if gov-
ernments maintain industrial relations policies that reﬂect the full
employment-type high-union membership structure of the ﬁrst
20 years after WWII. Governments have introduced new industrial
relations policies aimed at supporting and encouraging ‘ﬂexibility’
in the workplace in the name of innovation. This ﬂexibility relates
to the ability of ﬁrms to lower labour cost and structures which
reduce marginal costs of old technologies, delaying introduction of
new product and process innovations.11
As with PAFE, PAI is a class-based approach that can be applied
as a PBC. Towards the top of the expansion phase of the busi-
ness cycle, the negative shift in the state of business conﬁdence
identiﬁed above has implications for innovation. Incremental inno-
vation is strongly working through all the industry sectors in order
to reinforce beneﬁts of prior signiﬁcant innovation with minimal
new investment. Pressure is placed on governments to underpin
minor innovation by increasing their efforts to ensure minimising
capitalists’ loss of economic, policy and industrial power. Strength-
eningpolicies (andmore effectively enforcing existingpolicies) that
support incremental innovation can be applied in a boom period
withminimalnegativepolitical repercussions. Suchpolicies include
increased privatisation of established areas of the public sector
with easily available funding; stronger pro-business industrial rela-
tions with increased efforts to lower wages and thus retain old
technology; greater IPR support for established large companies
emboldening them against increased competition from new small
entrepreneurial players. All such actions undermine ‘true’ transfor-
mational innovation and encourage ‘spin-doctoring’ by powerful
commercial organisations. This ensures the sedation of radical
innovation, preventing stimulation of new activity during the cycli-
cal expansion. Renewal is delayed.
The delay in transformational innovation means that ﬁnan-
cial resources are siphoned away to create ﬁnancial bubbles. This
“bubble mania” has been identiﬁed in two different decoupling
mechanisms that separate the real and ﬁnancial economic sec-
tors. Both mechanisms are inﬂuenced by Schumpeter’s recognition
that the roles of entrepreneur and ﬁnancier as interdependent
(Schumpeter, 1939, p. 104). Perez (2002) identiﬁes the ﬁrst “bub-
ble mania” as a hiatus between installation and deployment of new
technology. This is a period when the new technology is exploited
in a reckless frenzy of “irrational exuberance” for capital gains on
9 For evidence of this, see Perez (2002).
10 For evidence of this, see Patel and Pavitt (2000).
11 For evidence of this, see Harcourt (1997).
any business plan that has a link to the newly installed technology
(e.g. 1840s USA railway boom and the late 1990s global dot.com
craze). Perez sees this periodas an inevitabledelay in theubiquitous
deployment of the new technology. In terms of Kalecki’s PBC, gov-
ernment innovation policy support through the boom for the newly
established capitalists, along the lines of the PAI model, sows the
seeds of the cyclical contraction that follows the inexorable burst-
ing of the bubble. The trend of the cycle remains on the upward part
of the long wave as this contraction is only a hiatus in the unfolding
technological trajectory (or diffusion) of the new technology sys-
tem (e.g. information and telecommunications in the post-WWII
period; Freeman and Perez, 1988, p. 53).
Minsky (1982) identiﬁes the second “bubblemania” that follows
the maturity of the new technology, as ﬁnanciers search for alter-
native highly speculative (or “Ponzi”) schemes. As the PAI model
explains the continued public innovation support for mature tech-
nology, then signiﬁcant installation of radical innovation in new
technology systems is delayed. Despite expansionary monetary
policy to ameliorate the previous “installation” contraction, gov-
ernment support for mature industries makes ﬁnanciers wary of
investing in new basic innovations (e.g. green innovations in the
early 2000s), and instead support “old” technologies (e.g. petrol-
guzzling automobiles in the early 2000s) which augment excess
capacity already building up in the latter.Mature industrieswill not
be able to soak up the available funds, so another round of Ponzi
ﬁnancing develops around ﬁnancial assets (e.g. sub-prime mort-
gages and collateralised debt obligations in the early 2000s). Again,
Kalecki’s PBC operates as governments’ PAI approach provides the
deregulatory space and ﬁnancial wherewithal for non-productive
ﬁnancial innovations (Kregel, 2008). This bubble sows the seeds
of the “deployment” contraction and further delaying the deep
installation of new technology systems, with monopoly capital
arguing that the economy cannot afford governments providing
support and stimulus to new, untried and expensive activities like
climate change based eco-innovations. The trend of the cycle is
more problematic in this contraction,with the depth of the contrac-
tion impacting on the long wave trend downwards (e.g. electrical
andheavy engineering in theGreat Depression; Freeman and Perez,
1988, p. 51).
When the business cycle is well into contraction, the cir-
cumstances for innovation substantial alter. Limited new capital
investment during the downturn from peak activity results in
very little innovation. This is despite much R&D and patenting
still going on.12 There is a large corpus of knowledge that is
not being commercialised, with attendant concerns that rates of
return are falling from old capital stock. As some companies fail to
sustain themselves through the contraction, the remaining ﬁrms
begin to feel the pressure of potential new entrants eager to
test themselves in the market that has been comatosed. Support
for government stimulation in effective demand by economists
and business commentators manifests itself by signiﬁcant ini-
tiatives in the area of innovation policy. Strong debate on the
nature and extent of this innovation-based stimulation will result
in some form of stimulatory package (but within institutional
constraints such as the contractionary ‘political trend’ identiﬁed
earlier). Eventually newcapital stockwill come forwardon thebasis
of transformational innovation incorporating newer technological
developments.
12 R&D expenditure is pro-cyclical in research based (e.g. pharmaceuticals) and
high-tech service based industries, as ﬁrms in these industries view R&D as capital
investment. Nevertheless, a large absolute amount of R&D would still go on during
contractions. All other industries tend to have constant R&D expenditure over the
business cycle due to the relatively small proportion R&D compared to total ﬁrm
expenditure (see Courvisanos, 2007).
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The PAI framework enables the tracking of innovation over
the period of a business cycle, and identifying the role govern-
ment policy plays in innovation within the context of the cycle.
This framework can be used to evaluate the policy situation in a
country, region or speciﬁc industry. In the process, another ver-
sion of the Kaleckian dilemma arises. Governments in advanced
developed economies have the policy tools and techniques to
encourage and support innovation as a driver of ecologically sus-
tainable development [ESD] during long periods of economic
growth (see Courvisanos, 2005). From the private sector, strong
proﬁtsandconsumerdemandcouldpromotewhat canbe identiﬁed
as transformative innovation, redirecting the trajectory of economic
development towards ESD. Yet the dilemma from the PAI perspec-
tive is that this form of radical innovation is highly unlikely. PAI
sees the encouragement of marketing-based incremental innova-
tion during the boom. This can be identiﬁed as evasive innovation
in pursuit of a traditional economic development growth path by
externalising environmental and other negative spillovers. The eco-
nomicprosperity of theboombringswith it strongproﬁts and rising
economicwealth that should support ecologically sustainable inno-
vation, yet the political economy rationale explains why during a
longeconomicboomashift to this particular formof transformative
innovation is highly unlikely.
A current political economyexample canbe cited tobear out this
ESDKaleckian dilemma. As at November 2007, the national govern-
ments of both Australia and the USA had a long-standing objection
to ratifying the Kyoto Protocol on greenhouse emission targets. It is
interesting to note that USA is the absolute leader in greenhouse
emissions, while Australia is the per capita leader. Both see the
economic interests of powerful incumbent corporations as being
much more important than greenhouse warming and the conse-
quent ecological destruction. This encourages the continuation of
incremental evasive innovation that has only marginal beneﬁts to
the ecology but maximum beneﬁt to incumbent enterprises, while
ignoring the massive potential ecological (and national economic)
beneﬁts accruing from a transformative pro-ecology innovation
trajectory.13
5. Political economy implications for innovation policy
With developed economies accepting the Kaleckian contrac-
tionary political trend since the mid-1970s, governments have
restricted severely their expansionary spending policies. For
legitimation with the voting public, governments devised an
alternative strategy for encouraging employment. This alternative
pro-business strategy was described in the PAFE section as sup-
porting rearmament and war, tax cuts, R&D and entrepreneurship,
and lenient lending. The aim of this strategy has been to support
directly the capitalist accumulation process through (respectively)
defence contracts, private spending, technological change, and pri-
vate ﬁnance. Innovation and private investment are the expected
outcomes of this strategy. The USA was at the forefront of this
strategy. Reagan’s StarWars project and the two Bush Iraq wars led
the armaments spending, while a shift to small business devel-
opment by President Clinton was reinforced by President G.W.
Bush.14
13 In Australia, the election in December 2007 of the slightly left leaning Labor
Party on an electoral promise to ratify Kyoto has ended this unyielding position. In
the USA, the presidential election of President B. Obama in November 2008 also had
a similar effect. Discussion of these events would take the analysis out of political
economy and into the adjoining ﬁeld of political science.
14 “70 per cent of the new jobs in America are created by small businesses. I under-
stand that. And I have promoted during the course of the last four years one of the
most aggressive, pro-entrepreneur, small business policies. . .And so in a new term,
we will make sure the tax relief continues to be robust for our small businesses.”
The actual outcome of this pro-business strategy is mixed.
There have been innovation and jobs growth trends in developed
economies with varying degrees of success, but most particu-
larly in USA, Australia and Ireland. This success has been on the
back of the boom in diffusion of information and telecommunica-
tions [IT] general purpose technologies (Perez, 2002) and massive
growth in the Chinese and Indian economies taking advantage
of the hardware and software IT elements respectively (Arora
et al., 2001; OECD, 2008). Neither came from this pro-business
strategy, but more fundamental world developments in comput-
ers followed by Indian and Chinese versions of socialism that
were set in train during and immediately after WWII. On the
negative side, Osiatyn´ski (1997); Kalecki (1955, 1967) clearly iden-
tiﬁes the wealth gains of armaments-based industries with a high
social cost related to inequality, corruption, unproductive ends, and
entrenched monopoly power. Parker (2001, p. 382) also exposes
the myth of the entrepreneurial economy, in that much of the
small business growth is “. . .attributable to ‘push factors’ includ-
ing to outsourcing and downsizing by large ﬁrms and the changing
sectoral composition of employment, rather than ‘pull factors’ asso-
ciated with the superior dynamism of small ﬁrms.” Sylos-Labini
(1992) notes the complementarity of small ﬁrms to large ﬁrms
through vertical sequence and horizontal cooperation, ensuring
that successful small ﬁrms are often symbiotically lock-step depen-
dent on the industry that is dominated by the related large ﬁrms.
Finally, Davis et al. (1996) present longitudinal data on USA man-
ufacturing to show that small ﬁrms exhibit high job destruction
rates as well as high job creation rates, with no signiﬁcant net jobs
growth; but with higher uncertain career prospects and lower pay
and conditions for their employees.
Examining the business cycle itself, a boom generally leads to
the sedation of radical innovation as previously small ﬁrms are
growing through incremental improvement of their idea and larger
ﬁrms attempt to defend their market position through minimal
marketing-based and evasive innovation. In this situation, both
small and large ﬁrms are carrying out innovation through rent-
seeking behaviour with the assistance of government tax cuts and
incentives, as well as the provision of subsidies and the enforc-
ing of IPR (Stilwell, 2002, p. 225). In a cyclical contraction, many
small ﬁrmsdisappear,while largeﬁrmsattempt to reconstruct their
highly indebted balance sheets without going bankrupt. In such
circumstances there is less rent-seeking behaviour, but also very
limited opportunities to take advantage of the innovation policies
onoffer. It is at the troughof the cycle that innovationpolicy is taken
up for genuine creative opportunities by risk-taking entrepreneur-
managers. The problem is that tangible beneﬁt from innovation
policy occurs only during the occasional deep trough of the busi-
ness cycle. Genuine radical innovation that can be transformative
is highly constrained.
The PBC approach to innovation described above provides an
appreciation of the dynamics of innovation encouragement and
enhancement, as it is restricted within the boundaries speciﬁed
by O’Hara (2007) in the innovation–competition dialectic. Only
within these boundaries is the accumulation process viable. In a
boom, strong competition and minor incremental innovation lead
to quick dissipation of any monopoly rents. In a trough, innovation
is tentativewith great uncertainty aboutmonopoly rents, and if the
innovation is very successful, innovative ﬁrms need towork hard to
prevent dissipation of monopoly rents. Across this dialectic spec-
trum,ﬁrmsusepublic innovationpolicies to sustain theirmonopoly
rents. Viable capitalism operates within the narrow boundaries of
this spectrum, but this narrowness also severely limits the ability
(President G.W. Bush, Press Conference 4 November 2004; as quoted in Audretsch,
2006, p. xviii).
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of innovation policies to ‘make a difference’. The aim of effective
innovation policy planning should be to extend the boundaries of
operation in the context of this dialectic without threatening the
economy’s accumulation process.
The cycle and trendpatterns deduced from the PAI-based frame-
work are general. This frameworkneeds to be speciﬁed in particular
economies, but to do this the culture and political system of an
economy needs to be clearly delineated. Brown and Ulijn (2004)
bring together a set of studies that show the interaction of innova-
tion and entrepreneurship with speciﬁc national, professional and
corporate cultural dimensions produces various patterns of innova-
tion which, nevertheless, have commonalities. Thus, each economy
portrays the dynamics of innovation differently. Each is but a vari-
ation on the theme of the political economy innovation aspects
identiﬁed above.
The politico-economic models by Frey (1978) can be used to
identify themes around a group of economies that share impor-
tant cultural and institutional elements.15 The English-speaking
nations are inﬂuenced most strongly by the market-oriented con-
tractionary ‘political trend’ that has penetrated all economies that
operate within global markets. Scandinavian nations, China, India,
Japan and other robust Asian economies have a relatively stronger
commitment topublic policyproactive intervention.Mid-European
nations like Germany, The Netherlands and France place more
emphasis on economic stabilising elements based around Euro-
pean Union commitments and accords, but with some speciﬁc
proactive public policies. Southern European and South Ameri-
can nations have signiﬁcantly less sophisticated economic and
political institutions that have a mixture of all the above, but
with strong personality-based parochialism. Within this broad-
brush representation there are differences. For example, both
Singapore and Malaysia set out to develop a biotechnology inno-
vation cluster, yet only the former has been able to build “. . .a
signiﬁcant hub of activity.” (McColl, 2007, p. 16) Also, East-
ern Europe failed to sustain any innovation activity through
its communist period despite much R&D spending and proac-
tive planning. On the other hand, in strong capitalist economies
ﬁrms with monopoly power stymie innovation by locking-in tech-
nologies while exhibiting strong rent-seeking behaviour (Stark,
2001).
6. Conclusion
Innovation is transformational (in process) and economic (in
outcome). The political dimension casts a large shadow over both
process and outcome. The class-based approach outlined in this
paper identiﬁes the capitalist elements that drive innovation from
within its own reproduction system and the public support that
ensures susceptibility to future risk is ameliorated. All this occurs
within the context of the boom and bust of business cycles, for it
is these short-term economic forces that inﬂuence the shape and
form of innovation. Forces, both public and private, that are aimed
at ameliorating susceptibility to the three fears that capitalists have
over the cycle (i.e. loss of economic, policy and industrial control)
are the basic dynamic of the innovation process.
The 2008 GFC had its ﬁnancial roots in Ponzi ﬁnancing using
sub-primemortgages and collateralised debt obligations in theUSA
15 A large body of comparative capitalism literature emerged in the mid-1990s
aiming to understand the institutional foundations of diverse national varieties of
capitalism (see Deeg and Jackson, 2007). The best-known framework by Hall and
Soskice (2001) is relevant because it is ﬁrm-centred, but it is limited by having only
two varieties. Frey (1978), in contrast, has a more diverse typology. For this paper
it is adequate to note that the PAI analysis would have to be different in discrete
varieties of capitalism.
(Kregel, 2008). However, the economic roots of the GFC go deep
into the global innovation process over a much longer time period.
The seeds of what the IMF in 2009 called “Great Recession”, hark
back to theantecedents of the2000–2001 “installation” contraction
of the IT technology system. The dot.com bubble is an example of
the (irrational?) exuberance of a youthful innovation that extended
past its margin of safety. Fears of monopoly capital abounded prior
to the bubble bursting: Loss of economic and ﬁnancial control of
the system to small dot.com entrepreneurs, loss of policy control
as the IT system became distributed widely, and loss of industrial
control under innovation-generated full employment. Monopoly
capital and its government supporters regained the initiative in
the contraction, leading to innovation policies and practices that
brought the technology system back within its “cushion of safety”
(Kregel, 2008). Monetary authorities also increased global liquidity
to “soften” the contraction.
Deployment period of the IT system created another strong
growth phase—but not the “synergistic growth [with] a new reg-
ulatory framework” that Perez (2002, p. 167) was hoping for.
Instead, the IT system with excess funds enabled another Ponzi
bubble to arise, supported by huge consumer debt and eventu-
ally massive inventories of every form of consumer product from
houses and cars to microelectronics. Susceptibility to the three
fears again emerged, but this time not to a youthful part of the
IT sector, but to monopoly capital that underwrote the whole
consumerist culture developed in advanced capitalist economies.
IT-based innovation to support ﬁnancially and ecologically unsus-
tainable consumerism has again pushed the global economy past
its margins of safety.16
Kalecki’s political economy approach based on the PAI model
can be applied to innovation (including R&D). With this approach
a conjectural economic history of an economy or industry could be
used to reveal how innovationpolicies impact through the course of
a business cycle and the consequence this has for long-run develop-
ment of the innovation(s).17 Fromsuch an analysis, economic policy
for innovation and R&D support can be understood which could
then be used either as a critical realist examination of innovation
policy in capitalism or as a pragmatist approach to more coherent
innovation policy.
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